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ASSERTIVE MODESTY: AN ECONOMICS OF INTANGIBLES 
Wendy]. Gordon* 
The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society 
... like that of menial servants ... does not fix or realize itself in 
any permanent subject, or vendible commodity, which endures 
after that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of la-
bour could afterwards be procured . . . . In the same class must 
be ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and 
some of the most frivoulous professions: churchmen, lawyers, 
physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musi-
cians .... 
- Adam Smithl 
... and some designers of computer programs. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the center of our Symposium stand two papers: "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" (Manifesto) 2 
and "Legal Hybrids: Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms" 
(LegalHybrids).3 Both are stimulating. Both are lengthy. As a result, my 
primary role is that of a guide: this Comment will summarize the au-
thors' proposals, analyze certain aspects in greater detail, and outline 
their explicit and implicit methodologies. Part I of the Comment de-
scribes the papers' positions and methodologies. Part II highlights some 
of the papers' many contributions to the literature, and offers some other 
evaluative observations. 
* Copyright© 1994 Wendy J. Gordon. Professor of Law, Boston University School of 
Law. Thanks are owed to Anne Gowen, Elly Leary, and Jim Lindgren for editing 
suggestions on this Comment, and to David Friedman and Rob Merges for substantive 
suggestions. 
I would like to express my admiration for the unique collaboration that lies at the 
center of this Symposium. We in the audience have access to the Manifesto and Legal 
Hybrids only because four experts from the fields of law and computer science met monthly 
over a period of several years. I would also like to thank three of these authors in particular 
(Randy Davis, Jerry Reichman, and Pam Samuelson) for all I've learned by being included 
in some of their penultimate discussions. I also thank those three for comments on this 
Comment-but I caution the reader that the interpretations it contains are my own. 
I. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 295 
(Alfred A. Knopf 1991) (1784). The quotation from Smith is meant as a reminder of the 
fundamental nature of intellectual property law: It is a mode of converting mental labor 
into a "vendible commodity." 
2. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter Manifesto]. 
3. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids: Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 2432 (1994) [hereinafter Legal Hybrids]. 
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I. GUIDE TO THE MAIN PAPERS 
A The Basic Theses of the Main Papers 
[Vol. 94:2579 
The Manifesto and Legal Hybrids analyze how the law should treat 
computer software and other intangible creations (primarily industrial 
designs) that are not easily adaptable to the traditional paradigms of 
copyright and patent. Both papers converge on a path one might call 
assertive modesty:. assertive in claiming that legal protection for such in-
tangibles rests on sound, justifiable ground, and modest in the extent of 
metes and bounds so claimed. 
In implementing this vision, the authors are not presenting a 
blueprint for immediate action; rather, their aim is to develop a useful 
structure and agenda for the policymaking community.4 This is particu-
larly true of Legal Hybrids, which provides a flexible "menu of options" 
from which policymakers can choose in dealing with various types of in-
dustrial design.5 Nevertheless, in the Manifesto, the authors converge on 
one proposal-one particular legal hybrid-which they think would 
greatly improve the law of computer software. 
The Manifesto proposal does not eliminate the protection the law 
now gives to the particular sequences of code that a computer program-
mer writes; software code is "text" which the Manifesto agrees should and 
·will be protected by ordinary copyright law. What the Manifesto addresses 
is the conceptually troubling fact that programs "behave. "6 
Software behavior, despite its great economic value, cannot be relia-
bly protected through the medium of protecting code, since vastly differ-
ent codes can yield the same behavior;7 yet the authors persuasively 
demonstrate that program behavior standing alone is a poor fit with both 
the copyright and patent paradigms.8 Protecting program behavior 
4. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2315. 
5. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 3, at 2539-44. Such menus could assist in generating 
the incentives to ensure that creative copyists engage in both research and development 
and production. 
6. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2316-17. 
7. See id. at 2345. 
8. The doctrinal limits of copyright and patent were crafted to meet particular 
objectives, and each reflects a balance among underlying policy concerns that could be 
distorted by protecting program behavior. Copyright is granted for a very long duration-
generally "life plus fifty"-precisely because it grants exclusive rights only in "expression," 
and not ideas, facts, or processes. The cost of copyright-fostered restrictions on access is 
therefore relatively low. Utility patents are granted, despite the fact that they give exclusive 
rights in products and processes which involve costly restrictions on access, precisely 
because their duration is short (seventeen years) and because the inventions so rewarded 
are nonobvious and novel. The net benefits of the resulting incentives are therefore very 
high. 
Protecting program behavior yields yet a different cost/benefit balance. Protecting 
such behavior will impose more costly reduced access than traditional copyright imposes. 
Similarly, protecting compilations of program behavior that fail to meet the 
nonobviousness and novelty standards of patent law could create economic incentives to 
overinvest in the development of products of only marginal social utility. It is therefore 
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under copyright is troubling because copyright protects only "expres-
sion," not processes.9 As for patent law, program behavior cannot be pat-
ented unless it is "novel" and "nonobvious," conditions that, the authors 
tell us, much program-behavior innovation cannot meet because the pro-
cess of program development tends to be incremental rather than mark-
edly innovative.1° Further, the comparative and historical studies of the 
Legal Hybrids paper indicate the difficulties-in particular, alternating pe-
riods of over- and underprotection-that incremental advances in the de-
sign of industrial products have posed for the traditional copyright and 
patent paradigms worldwide.11 Accordingly, the Manifesto proposes ex-
tending protection to aggregations of design behaviors, but in a form 
other than copyright and patent. 
The Manifesto suggests supplementing the current laws with a new 
regime, under which the producers of clones, near clones, and partial 
clones12 would be "blocked" for a given period of time unless they had 
obtained the consent of the entity which created the software being 
cloned. Although the Manifesto does not propose a specific duration, the 
authors hint that a period of three years, or even shorter, would be ac-
ceptable.13 As I interpret the Manifesto, potential competitors would re-
main free to develop a clone during the blocking period but not to dis-
tribute it. If the competitor could engineer improvements of the original 
design during the blocking period, at its close the clone creator could 
purchase a compulsory license to distribute the original program behav-
logical that non-novel incremental innovations in program behavior should receive 
exclusive rights narrower in scope and/ or duration than the exclusive rights offered by 
patent and copyright. 
9. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 1994) (only expression is protected by copyright; 
ideas, processes, etc., are not protected by copyright); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 
(1879) (accounting scheme is idea not protected by copyright); Computer Assocs. lnt'l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992) (reaffirming idea/expression 
dichotomy). But see Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (functional elements of program design 
implicitly held protectable under an extremely broad construction of idea/ expression 
dichotomy). 
10. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2346. 
11. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 3, at 2500-04. 
12. The definitions of these terms are somewhat vague. A "clone" seems to be a 
program that does everything the copied program does-and even looks the same on the 
screen to the user-but which emanates from an independently written code. Similarly, a 
"near clone" seems to be a complete functional substitute for the copied program, but with 
some minor variations. A "partial clone" seems to be a program that duplicates some 
particular combination of valuable program design elements, but does so as part of a 
program that also contains many other functions. 
The overall notion operating here seems to be that a plaintiff would need to show 
more than the "substantial similarity" required by copyright law in order to prove that the 
defendant's software constitutes a clone or even a near or partial clone. Thus, a fortiori, 
the schema created by the four authors does not envisage giving initial innovators an 
overall right over derivative works. Rather, the scope of the rights they would grant is quite 
narrow. 
13. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2413-15. 
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ior and add any interim improvements she has made.14 Thus, at the end 
of the blocking period, the creative copyist could offer consumers an al-
ternative competitive with the originator's updated version of the 
program. 
Protection against cloning would apply to non<ommonplace aggre-
gation of behavior design elements, or, what is much the same thing, 
cumulative innovation resulting from applied know-how.15 Protection 
would apply to program design whether it exists on or near the face of 
software16 or within a program.17 
The Manifesto seems to anticipate that during the blocking period 
markets will develop in which licenses may be purchased. To this end, 
the authors discuss software clearinghouses18 and other modes by which 
such transactions could be made easier. Under the Manifesto proposal, 
software designers could register their innovations before the close of the 
blocking period, thus increasing the public's access to this package of 
software behavior. 
14. As the original program evolved-and during a three-year period the creator of a 
successful program will surely issue many updates-the creator of the clone would be 
blocked from commercially reproducing any updates that were non-commonplace 
aggregates of design behavior unless a voluntary license was obtained. But, under my 
interpretation, during this period the clone's creator could work on original design 
improvements. This resembles the process of reverse engineering for the purpose of 
discovering a technological trade secret, which sometimes yields discoveries that improve 
the technology at issue. 
At the close of the three-year blocking period, even a clone creator who has been 
unable or unwilling to purchase a voluntary license might thus have a commercially viable 
option: A compulsory license could be obtained (for the program upon which her clone 
and improvements were built) and then, with the original improved designs built into the 
program, the clone creator would be able to offer consumers an alternative to the 
originator's updated version. At least, this is how I imagine the Manifesto scheme would 
work. 
15. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2422. 
16. The examples of external behavior that the authors seem to use most often are 
the desktop metaphor (as seen on the Macintosh) and user screen interfaces (such as the 
arrangement of commands on a spreadsheet). See, e.g., id. at 2417 ("A software developer 
might register, for exaIJJ.ple, a new user interface design."). However, one might query the 
appropriateness of protecting either of these particular program behaviors. The desktop 
metaphor seems too much like an "idea" to be a desirable candidate for protection, and 
consumer interfaces often develop into industry standards. There is a great deal of 
controversy over whether ownership of standards should be permitted. See, e.g., David 
Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach, 19 U. Dayton L. 
Rev. 1109 (1994) (an economic perspective); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 
Yale LJ. 1533, 1583-91, 1600-01 (a rights perspective). 
·11. Note that the authors are much more convinced about the desirability of 
protecting against copying of externally visible behavior than protecting against clones of 
internal design, as the former is more immediately accessible to trivial-cost acquisition by 
competitors. The latter may, however, become increasingly accessible over time as 
decompilation processes become quicker and less expensive. 
18. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2426-29. 
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Registration would also provide designers with an additional length 
of time, after the end of the blocking period, during which they would be 
entitled to payment.19 The Manifesto suggests that clones in the markets 
closest to those where the originator sells its program might be required 
to pay higher fees than the less competitive clones in more distant 
markets.20 
In short, the Manifesto suggests a scheme wherein designers of pro-
gram behavior receive protection for non-commonplace compilations of 
such behavior. The scheme creates a new duty that attaches to the sale or 
other distribution21 of clones, near clones, and partial clones. The duty 
takes different remedial forms in each of two stages: during an initial 
short blocking period, it is a duty to refrain from copying enforced by 
injunction; during a subsequent period governed by liability rules, it is an 
obligation to pay for copying behavioral compilations which the proprie-
tors have deposited in a registry. 
The Manifesto proposal is only one of the many types of possibilities 
Jerome Reichman explores in Legal Hybrids. That paper takes the reader 
through the history of many nations' laws to examine the often self-de-
feating struggle to stretch copyright and patent models to cover advances 
in the design of industrial products. Reichman also advances a powerful 
thesis: Not only has the' largely binary vision of the world community 
often resulted in blindness to statutory possibilities other than copyright 
and patent, but it has also resulted in a false notion-what he calls the 
"negative premise"-that outside those two statutes resides a legal 
vacuum.22 
Reichman powerfully argues that the protections available outside 
copyright and patent have great (and usually undervalued) economic sig-
nificance. In his view, these alternative modes of discouraging copying, 
most notably trade secret law, have offered such a significant degree of 
protection that intellectual property's negative premise-the assumption 
19. See id. at 2414-15. Some might term such payments "compulsory license fees," 
after the many compulsory licenses in the current copyright statute. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 
§ 115 (1988) (compulsory licensing for making and distribution of phonorecords). 
20. The Manifesto's adoption of a liability-rule remedial stage has been criticized on 
the grounds that developing a liability rule system can be expensive and difficult, even in 
the presence of clear rules. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and 
Intellectual Property 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2655 (1994) (critique of Legal Hybrids' 
proposal of liability rules). However, this criticism is less powerful if a market has 
developed during the blocking period. In such a case the registry-based compulsory 
market to be e.stablished during the liability-rule remedial stage would have a set of pre-
existing prices on which to build, and the administrative burdens would be limited. 
Nevertheless, Merges's central point-that more inquiry is needed into the economic 
effect of eliminating owners' rights to refuse licenses-is well taken. 
21. As discussed above, I assume that regime would allow clones to be developed 
during the blocking period, so long as they were not distributed. Market richness would be 
promoted by allowing such pre-sale work to be done without a license. See supra text 
following note 13. 
22. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 3, at 2448-53. 
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that intangibles not protected by copyright and patent are free for all to 
copy-is essentially incorrect, a myth whose influence has hampered the 
development of a law of industrial design.23 
Further, in his view, the significance of trade secret law is not under-
mined by the fact that trade secrets are vulnerable to reverse engineering. 
Rather, Reichman sees this vulnerability as a virtue, in that reverse engi-
neering offers potential users an extra choice in the marketplace: to re-
verse engineer instead of obtaining a license.24 In addressing those legal 
hybrids that cannot be kept secret, such as software design evident on or 
near the face of a program, he recommends modelling a new regime 
after trade secret law, seeking to minimize functionally exclusive protec-
tion in favor of regimes which give users a range of practical choices.25 
One sees obvious echoes of this preference in the Manifesto proposal, par-
ticularly in the fairly short length of the blocking period and the provi-
sion for compulsory licenses. 
Yet the two papers are not identical. Most notably, in Legal Hybrids, 
Reichman seems to envisage a more flexible regime, one which will be 
adapted to each instance of copying. By contrast, the Manifesto recom-
mends a "well-lit playing field"26 of fairly bright-line demarcations. I sus-
pect that Reichman is much more optimistic than his compatriots-and 
he is certainly more optimistic than I am-about the likelihood that re-
ciprocal conditions will exist among the industry players,27 and that they 
will be willing to work out sensible arrangements without wasteful 
litigation. 28 
23. See id. at 2445. 
24. See id. at 2535-36. 
25. See id. at 2519-25. 
26. Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2406. 
27. The Legal Hybrids paper argues that if all players are in a reciprocal position, and 
none knows what position tomorrow will bring-creator or copier-all should favor 
arrangements that help them avoid the suboptimal result of too much copying. 
Reciprocity, in Professor Reichman's view, is everywhere. Therefore, Reichman 
recommends encouraging segments of the computer industry to self-govern by, for 
example, loosening current antitrust restraints on their making agreements among 
themselves. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 3, at 2555-57. Reichman also predicts that 
when newcomers appear the same rationale of reciprocity would encourage them to sign 
on to the contracts or customs. If they do not adhere to industry practice, he assumes the 
law would be justified in extending the standards of that practice to these new players. 
However, today's newcomer who needs to copy may not be tomorrow's "big company" 
and the rules set by today's major players may not be in the newcomer's interest. Even if 
both need to copy, they are differently situated. Among other things, the big company 
undoubtedly will have its ·own intellectual property which it can trade with other large 
companies. See Merges, supra note 20, at 2663 (discussion of patent pools). 
28. Reichman would argue, I believe, that flexibility could occur without extreme 
administrative burden because industry customs would evolve. Interview with Jerome H. 
Reichman (Sept. 1994). Perhaps I am unduly influenced by Adam Smith, but business 
combinations have so often failed to further the public interest, and large rights holders 
have so rarely given adequate scope to new entrants that it seems to me dangerous to risk 
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B. Some Details 
Both papers are written with the awareness that further fine-tuning 
will be necessary. For example, I would appreciate more detail on how 
protection would be awarded-how does one determine if a design is 
non-commonplace? What if it is not novel? What entity will determine 
whether the applicable standard has been met? Of the various questions 
left open, perhaps the most important is how the length of the blocking 
period will be determined. At least four possibilities exist, the first three 
of which are hinted at in the Manifesto. 
The first focuses on how long it would take to encourage a market to 
evolve. According to this approach, if voluntary markets are feasible, the 
blocking period should be at least long enough to permit their evolution. 
This approach arises in part from the concern that setting prices in the 
absence of voluntary markets will be difficult. 
A second possibility is to tie the length of the blocking period to the 
likely cycles of productivity in the relevant industry segment.29 In this 
light, the Manifesto implies that the blocking period should be long 
enough so that if well-crafted pieces of unsuccessful programs later be-
come useful in others' programs, the creators of those useful pieces could 
be re·warded and remain live players in the industry. 
A third possibility is to determine the length of the blocking period 
by reference to the time necessary for a creating entity to collect suffi-
cient revenue to repay its reasonable investment in research and develop-
ment. Reimbursing research and development expenses would remove 
the most dramatic danger to market incentives30-namely, the fear of 
potential creators that if they invest in making a program and are lucky or 
skillful enough to produce exactly what the public wants, a competitor 
could cheaply copy and undersell them with new instances of the origina-
tor's own product design. If this happened, the creative firm could lose 
all it invested. 
This fear-that one who engages in socially desirable behavior will 
be injured precisely because of her contribution-is a classic problem of 
social organization, made famous by Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the 
Commons" and highlighted more recently by the popularity of the pris-
oners' dilemma as an analytic model.31 If the Manifesto's scheme works 
further empowering established players by handing them a right to sue of ambiguous 
breadth. 
29. What the four authors mean by "cycle" still needs more definition. 
30. Of course, sales during the blocking period are not the sole source of an 
innovator's income. Thus, the four authors can be seen as recommending that the 
blocking period (and the period of liability·rule relief) be set so that the total revenue 
reaped by a successful innovation, from all sources, would equal research and development 
costs, perhaps plus a reasonable rate of return. 
31. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in Bruce A. Ackerman, 
Economic Foundations of Property Law 2 (1975). In the prisoners' dilemma, two 
reciprocally-situated parties might be able to gain from mutual cooperation, but each fears 
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well (which it may not32), potential creators will be liberated from this 
fear: they know they will not be ruined by engaging in software research 
and development if their product is successful. There is, therefore, a rea-
son to measure the period of protection by the time it would likely take 
the maker of a popular product to obtain reimbursement. 
But setting the duration with this limited goal in mind does not at-
tempt to achieve an optimal incentive scheme. This may be a wise choice, 
but it differs from the usual economic prescription, under which the pro-
tected period would allow recoupment of the amount needed to induce a 
competent entity to make the requisite research and development 
investment. 33 
In order for the Manifesto's scheme to provide such optimal incen-
tives for investment-the fourth possible criterion for shaping the block-
ing period-the amount to be recouped should not simply equal the 
amount spent on research and development.34 Among other things, 
some multiplier is needed to compensate for uncertain odds of success.35 
If the authors have in mind such a multiplier, more questions must be 
resolved, such as whether the multiplier should be keyed to the odds of 
success in a particular venture or instead to the overall odds of success in 
a type of enterprise;36 how much the intellectual property-generated reve-
nue can be safely reduced because of producers' alternate sources of rev-
enue (such as that resulting from copyright in the code and from natural 
lead time), and what rate of reasonable profit would need to be included 
in the calculus. 
But the authors of the Manifesto appear to be chary of deciding on 
any such level of perfect incentive. They seem instead to focus on the 
third possibility mentioned: a period which would allow a typical firm 
to cooperate because there is a high penalty attached to cooperating if the other party does 
not. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoners' Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853, 859-68 (1992) (presence of prisoners' 
dilemma or other market failure suggests there may be an economic need for intellectual 
property protection) [hereinafter Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure]. 
32. It is hard to imagine how-given the many different patterns that industrial 
success can take-one could designate an all-purpose durational term within which costs 
are likely to be recouped. 
33. See, e.g., Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price 
Discrimination, in 8 Research in Law and Economics 181, 183-88 (John Palmer & Richard 
0. Zerbe eds., 1986). 
34. The authors are wary of encouraging plaintiffs to overstate the amount spent on 
research and development, or of encouraging them to overspend during development. 
The authors thus recommend that an average or reasonable figure be used, in lieu of 
linking the plaintiff's recovery to its own expenditures. 
· 35. This is a much more complex proposition than it appears. See, e.g., Robert P. 
Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 High Tech. LJ. 1, 20-30, 57-62 
(1993) (attempting to model the decision to invest in invention). 
36. See id. at 20-57. Thus, one of the typical arguments made in favor of extensive 
copyright protection for books is that the occasional blockbuster success will compensate 
publishers for the risks they take on first novels. Under the latter sort of view, the profit 
from successful ventures must be sufficient to make the entire enterprise worthwhile. 
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which has created a successful program to recover its reasonable research 
and development expenses, without compensation for the uncertain odds 
of success. 
The authors also are sensitive to the first two possibilities-keeping 
duration long enough for markets to evolve and for the designers of use-
ful pieces of program design to find their rewards-though the authors 
are not clear how these goals are to be integrated. (One suggestion: per-
haps the concern with giving incentives to the creators of program pieces 
can be met during the compulsory license period, so that this considera-
tion could be eliminated from computation of the blocking period.) 
Nevertheless, although the Manifesto is not fully clear about how the 
blocking period should be determined, its estimate of a very brief block-
ing period plus a liability-rule phase, presumably of similar brevity, is use-
ful. It informs us that from the perspective of four experts steeped in the 
field, the health of the software industry could be ensured by providing 
behavioral compilations with protection for a more brief period than that 
provided by most American intellectual property laws.37 
C. The Methodol,ogy of the Main Papers 
The papers are economic in emphasis. As is well recognized, al-
lowing free copying generates great short-term economic benefits for 
consumers but is likely, because of disincentive effects, to fail to serve 
consumers' long-run interests. Given this tension between the short- and 
long-term economic effects of both creation and copying, it is no easy 
matter to determine what balance would achieve the highest net value. 
In seeking to balance access and incentives, the four authors implicitly 
make several methodological choices. 
As an overall matter, the four authors have chosen to mine the tradi-
tion of analyzing intellectual property regimes in terms of market failure 
and encouraging a rich market structure.38 Consistent with this tradition, 
they acknowledge that there are at least two levels at which markets can 
fail to foster appropriate cost/benefit tradeoffs. At the first level, public 
goods-things that can be shared by many without physical diminution, 
and for which it is difficult to exclude nonpayors-can give rise to a pat-
tern in which consumers will get less of the good than they would other-
wise be willing to pay for. Such market failures can be costly enough to 
justify the law in imposing restraints on copying, such as the law of copy-
37. For example, under current law we see seventeen years of exclusive right for utility 
patents, see 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). 
38. For my initial attempt to ground intellectual property law in the market context, 
see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1602-04, 1618-24 (1982) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use]. For discussion beyond the copyright context, see, e.g., Saul 
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985) (suggesting courts should 
construct legal rules for restitution that encourage "thick" markets to evolve) and the 
sources cited infra note 46. 
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right, patent, and unfair competition. The authors also acknowledge, 
however, that such legal restraints may generate markets which imper-
fectly foster costjustified transfers. When this occurs, the law should re-
spond to this second market failure by limiting intellectual property 
rights (and concomitantly restoring areas of copy liberty) to keep the cost 
of this second market failure as low as possible.39 
The Manifesto implements its market emphasis by means of a three-
part approach. First, where a copyist's trivial acquisition of behavioral 
equivalence40 is likely to destroy incentives, the authors recommend a 
period of injunction against clones to give voluntary markets a chance to 
evolve. Second, recognizing that markets may nevertheless fail to follow 
the institution of this blocking period, the authors recommend eliminat-
ing the injunctive power after a short period of time and substituting 
compulsory licenses.41 Third, where the authors doubt that even protec-
tion through licensing schemes would be worth its costs, they recom-
mend-via limitations on the scope and duration of protection-restor-
ing a liberty to copy. 
Note that in addressing market failure, the four authors choose to 
focus on market creation rather than market mimicry. Given empirical 
and theoretical difficulties (including the random barriers to perfection 
emphasized by the theory of the second-best),42 the four authors do not 
discuss "value maximization" as measured by the outcome of a hypotheti-
cal perfect market.43 Rather, they have a more modest and potentially 
more achievable goal. The Manifesto authors aim to encourage real mar-
kets to form. 
Creating voluntary markets can be a way to increase a society's wel-
fare with lower administrative cost and more reliability than assigning an 
administrative agency (or court) the responsibility for divining where 
rights should be held in a perfect market. In a market, resources are not 
exchanged unless proof is present that the exchange is pareto superior: 
someone is willing to. pay more for what is received than the seller de-
39. A more formal explication and application of this approach can be found in 
Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 38, at 1610-14. For the Manifesto's explicit adoption of this 
model, see Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2339-40. 
40. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2339-41, 2422-25. 
41. Compulsory licenses and non-injunctive remedies can ensure fair use, but such 
liability-rule options are often avoided by copyright courts, presumably because of the 
administrative costs. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 38, at 1618-24. Today, judges are 
more open to exploring liability-rule avenues in copyright litigation. See, e.g., Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 n.10 (1994) ("the goals of the copyright law 
... are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief') ;James L. Oakes, 
Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 983, 992-97 
(1990) (suggesting that even in cases where a violation of right is proved and gives rise to 
monetary relief, free speech principles might warrant the denial of injunctive relief). 
42. For example, the theory of the second-best posits that ifthere is imperfection in a 
market, a partial "cure" may further worsen resource allocation rather than improve it. 
43. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 11-12 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing 
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks concepts of "value maximization"). 
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mands as recompense for what is given up.44 Given _these advantages, 
therefore, one of the principles implicitly guiding the authors' recom-
mendations is what I have termed "asymmetric market failure condi-
tions": Adopting rights of exclusion is likely to be appropriate when such 
rights can simultaneously (1) avert costly market failures and (2) create 
new markets.45 
Thus, instead of searching for "pareto optimality," the four authors 
use a looser notion of efficiency in deciding which markets to encourage 
and by what means. Rather than seeking the legal regime that can offer 
the greatest excess of benefits over costs, they have a more modest goal: 
to develop a legal regime that in the face of changing circumstances will 
tend to yield a greater net of benefits over costs than will our current 
system. 
Yet the Manifesto authors still face the challenge of giving content to 
their meliorative notion of efficiency. How is it to be achieved? Here the 
four authors have two implicit responses. One has already been inti-
mated: the authors employ a prisoners' dilemma-type model to identify 
the circumstances in which rational, risk-neutral actors are particularly 
likely to behave in an economically inefficient way.46 They then recom-
mend methods of altering those circumstances. The second response is 
implicit in their use of history. 
As previously mentioned, there is a sort of mythology in the intellec-
tual property field. The Supreme Court opinions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffel Co. 47 and Compco v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc. 48 serve as a kind of 
progenitor text. The myth is that outside of narrow confines, liberty of 
44. Also, assuming a distributional or corrective justice foundation for their starting 
points, real markets are often more fair than are allocations achieved by uncompensated 
transfers. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214-24 (1967) 
(distinguishing situations in which fairness does and does not require compensation). 
45. For discussions of asymmetric market conditions, see Wendy J. Gordon, 
Asymmetric Market Failure, supra note 31, at 853-59; Wendy J. Gordon, Of Hanns and 
Benefits: Torts, Restitution and Intellectual Property, 21J. Legal Stud. 449, 452-62 (1992); 
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 171-96, 202, 238-51 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning 
Information]. 
46. On the prisoners' dilemma, see supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also 
Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2339-40 (recapitulating my unpublished six-element model of 
the prisoners' dilemma). One condition giving rise to a prisoners' dilemma is likely to be 
absent even if the law takes no affirmative steps: consumer trust that the copy and the 
original program will function and be maintained identically. The copy will not evoke the 
same level of consumer trust as the original product because it lacks the same track record. 
47. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
48. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). In both cases, state unfair competition law that prohibited 
the copying of functional designs was struck down as pre-empted. For a recent 
reaffirmation of this approach, see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141 (1989). The Court stressed that "the federal patent laws do create a federal right to 
'copy and to use' " and that this right privileges the public to duplicate any non-secret 
invention not protected by a patent. See id. at 165. 
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copying is the rule. Much of the Legal Hybrids paper is dedicated to iden-
t:il}ing this implicit myth-the negative premise of intellectual prop-
erty-and showing that, as a descriptive matter, free copying occupies a 
much smaller proportion of the real world than we have imagined or 
been ready to admit. Primary examples of non-federal limits on free 
copying include "natural lead time" and trade secrecy regimes. In this 
way, Legal Hybrids essentially tells its audience that, "if you more or less 
like the way that the world's technology has been developing, do not as-
sume it is due to the mythological background of free copying. Free 
copying has been an island in a sea of copying restraints. Rather sud-
denly-with the advent of computers and programs bearing expensive-to-
develop but easily copied know-how-the historic balance between copy-
ing and not copying has changed. To maintain our current health, the 
legal regime has to change as well, and provide some restraints on copy-
ing-roughly equivalent to what has been available for evolving technolo-
gies in the past-to protect the practitioners in this newly valuable and 
newly vulnerable area." Thus, the authors implicitly suggest that the his-
torical, pre-computer balance between incentives and access should pro-
vide both a model for current development. 
II. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MAIN p APERS 
One of the most important contributions of the papers is the wealth 
of information they offer. Legal Hybrids allows us to share its author's 
remarkable transnational knowledge of the world's experiments with in-
tellectual property regimes, while the Manifesto makes the usually daunt-
ing arena of computer programming far more accessible. These charac-
teristics of the papers result from the authors having been steeped not 
only in American law, but also in history, comparative experience, and 
the technology and industrial structure at issue. The result is a remarka-
ble clarity in the software area, a field known most for its judicial 
muddles. 
A second contribution is the authors' recognition of the high costs of 
overprotection. Unlike tangible products, intellectual products cannot 
aspire to a perfectly competitive equilibrium that simultaneously covers 
the producers' long-run average costs and provides access to all consum-
ers willing and able to pay enough to cover marginal costs.49 Barring 
perfect price or cost discrimination, even the most finely tuned property 
system governing intangibles will necessarily embody a form of social 
waste.so When a producer has the power to restrain strangers from copy-
49. Under the model of perfect competition, "price equals both cost of production 
and value to the user, both of which must therefore be equal to each other." David D. 
Friedman, Price Theory: An Intermediate Text 38 (2d ed. 1990). 
50. For an, exploration of perfect price discrimination, see Harold Demsetz, The 
Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. Law & Econ. 293 (1970). David Friedman has 
suggested in conversation that the Manifesto authors seem to be inspired by a vision of 
perfect cost discrimination: all producers would be able to recoup the exact amount of 
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ing an intangible, whether that intangible is a story, an idea, an industrial 
invention, or a computer program, such restraint will inevitably deny ac-
cess to the intangible to some persons who would be willing to pay a price 
for it higher than its marginal cost.51 Further, intellectual property laws 
make each covered product "unique,"52 and where products are 
unique-and thus not fungible-one cannot securely rely on competi-
tion to expand quantity and limit prices. 
Given the dangers of overprotection, the Manifesto goes little further 
than demanded by the most minimal economic goal of providing re-
search and development expense.53 This is an intriguing departure from 
the so-called "property" model, embodying virtually unlimited internal-
ization of benefits, that increasingly has threatened to dominate our law 
of intellectual products during this past half century.54 Instead of giving 
a property right on the assumption that the creator is entitled to reap the 
benefits of anything that would not have existed "but for" the initial crea-
tion, the two papers implicitly ask why such rights are given. In their 
view, rights to forbid copying incremental advances in program design 
should be given for reasons of incentives.55 Receipts are not justified if 
they exceed what could be justified by the operative rationale. In so do-
ing the authors return to the well-reasoned bases of intellectual property 
profit necessary to reimburse product development. This characterization seems correct. 
The next question is whether cost discrimination among producers could be achieved 
more practicably than price discrimination among consumers. 
51. The cornerstone of perfectly competitive solutions is that price equals marginal 
cost. However, the marginal cost of reproducing an intangible will rarely exceed the 
marginal cost of the physical inputs employed, such as paper or computer disks. If so, no 
appreciable part of the marginal costs would be attributable to the expense of creating the 
intangible itself. Therefore, if the price of copying were set at a level equal to the marginal 
cost of producing an extra unit of the intangible, there would be insufficient incentives for 
producers of intangibles to produce new products. 
52. I am indebted to Rob Merges for reminding me of this fundamental fact. 
53. Research and development recoupment would assuage the fear that sets into 
motion the destructive dynamics of the prisoners' dilemma. See supra notes 31 and 46. 
54. For a property model that emphasizes exclusiveness, see David Ladd, The Harm 
of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc'y 421, 425-26 (1983). 
55. See Manifesto, supra note 2, at 2332-33. 
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law56 rather than being carried away by the transnational protectionist 
tide.57 
The third contribution of the two papers, and Legal Hybrids in partic-
ular, is that they succeed in opening even the most stubborn minds (like 
mine) to the notion that the negative premise of intellectual property 
law-that things not protected by copyright and patent are "free as the 
air to common use"58-may have been wishful thinking. Though I am 
still not convinced that it is desirable to abandon the negative premise as 
a baseline from which to examine intellectual property problems, Legal 
Hybrids has caused a subtle yet seismic shift in my methods of approach-
ing the topic. 
CONCLUSION 
The Manifesto and Legal Hybrids, taken together, have for the first 
time persuaded me that our law should indeed contain some explicit pro-
tection not only for software text, but also for software behavior in-
dependent of patentability. The authors have accomplished this by logic, 
by historical example, and most of all, by presenting the reader with a 
plausible preliminary model of the shape such protection should take. In 
doing so, the authors have demonstrated a praiseworthy concern with 
identifying and preserving the legitimate domain of the liberty to copy-
the "negative premise" of intellectual property law. Though in my view 
they should have given this latter concern even greater centrality, one 
cannot deny the value of their overall accomplishment. 
56. In the United States, adoption of copyright and patent laws was based primarily 
on grounds of social welfare. As the Constitution states, these protections advance the 
progress of science and the useful arts. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Founders also 
recognized justice-based "claims of individuals," but in a limited way. See The Federalist 
No. 43, at 272 ijames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The justice-based claims of 
creators may have helped to justify the provision of rewards, but were not seen as requiring 
that rewards be set equal to all the benefits for which the created work was a "but-for" 
cause. 
At the birth of the nation, the only intangibles considered significant were expressive 
works and inventions (novel, nonobvious, utilitarian works). Accordingly, the federal 
system initially protected only these intangibles. As Legal Hybrids makes clear, this two-part 
system has been strained by a host of developments that are neither expression nor 
invention. The two papers go back to the questions asked in the eighteenth century-how 
long a period of protection is warranted to provide incentives for the intangible at issue-
rather than trying to "squeeze" computer programs and other legal hybrids into either the 
patent or copyright box. 
57. This protectionist tide can be seen in the recent doubling of the copyright 
duration. Compare the 1909 Copyright Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (copyrights in published work 
expire after 28 years unless renewed for an additional 28 years) with the current act, 17 
U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (most copyrights in published work subsist for the 
life of the author plus fifty years). 
58. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, 
]., dissenting). 
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The quotation from the Wealth of Nations, with which this Essay be-
gan, implicitly signals the possibility that some laborers will fail to work 
productively if no reward is provided by circumstances or by law. But, 
side by side with such sentiments, Adam Smith's treatise recounts numer-
ous instances where business combinations enlisted the law's aid for ends 
that worked against the public interest, and sometimes even against the 
business's own interests.59 It is the difficult task of intellectual property 
law in general-a task well executed by these authors in particular-to 
steer a course between these two extremes. 
59. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 55 (discussing effects of laws which give business 
combinations monopoly powers). " 
